This paper conducts the first analysis of sentencing disparities related to social characteristics of offenders in Russia. It uses the dataset of sentencing decisions consisting of over 5 million observations. The data allows to account for effects of general social status characteristics as well as for finer occupational differences on decisions to imprison and on sentence length. The regression analysis established a number of effects connected with gender, unemployment, citizenships, local residence, marital status as well as with occupational status categories. Sentencing disparities have different origins, which the paper explains. Some disparities originate directly from legal rules and their application, some in legitimate concerns of judges, some in technical conditions of the criminal process, and others in extralegal concerns and attitudes.
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The sentencing research looks for systematic sentencing disparities and tends to explain them with reference to extralegal factors. Empirical studies paid particular attention to the influence of the social structure on sentencing, assessing effects of race, ethnicity, gender, age, status, class, citizenship, confession, and locality of defendants upon the type and severity of punishment controlling for legally significant offence characteristics. Identifying 76 studies in the USA that used original datasets, a meta-analysis (Mitchell and MacKenzie 2004) stated that no consensus with regard to the influence of race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status on sentencing has emerged over seventy years of research. Methodological challenges and policy relevance stimulate demand for new research whereas new data and methods make it possible.
Since the achievements and omissions of sentencing research were reviewed in great detail by a number of scholars over the last twenty years (D'Alessio and Stolzenberg 1993; Chiricos and Crawford 1995; Spohn 2000; Zats 2000; Spohn 2009; Ulmer 2012) , there is no need for another review here. Until the 1990s the sociological research on the influence of socioeconomic status on sentencing developed separately from a much broader stream of racial and ethnic bias studies situated mainly but not exclusively within the field of criminology (Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000; Mustard 2001) . By correlating socioeconomic status of defendants and severity of punishment scholars tested the main propositions of critical criminology about the social conflict (Chiricos and Waldo 1975; Lizotte 1978; D'Alessio and Stolzenberg 1993) . Some found negative correlations for selected types of crime, such as violent crimes and drug possession. Others (Wheeler, Weisburd, and Bode 1982; Hagan and Parker 1985) focused on the sentencing of white-collar criminals occupying high-status positions and found that the latter were punished more harshly. Their conclusions were later questioned and subjected to further tests that did not fully confirm the aforementioned pattern (Benson and Walker 1988) . The introduction of additional class position variables showed that class exercised a separate influence upon sentencing but in the way that confirmed the pattern of harsher punishments for white-collar crimes of individuals in positions of wealth and prestige (Weisburd, Waring, and Wheeler 1990 ). Chiricos and Bales (1991) made an important turn by taking unemployment as the main proxy of low social status for assessing its influence on sentencing. Their research showed that unemployment had a significant, substantial, and independent impact on the decision to imprison. Unemployment also interacted with ethnicity and age, amplifying the chances of imprisonment for young black males (Chiricos and Bales 1991: 719; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer 1998) . As unemployment became the major indicator of socioeconomic status and was analytically coupled with ethnicity and gender, the sociological research on status and class bias in sentencing merged with studies of racial and ethnic discrimination in courts. Given the enduring political significance of race and ethnicity for the American society and the fact that they continue to act as a major factor of social stratification, this merger is quite logical.
For all the importance of unemployment and ethnicity conjuncture in the American society, the recent research tends to omit other socially-induced inequalities in sentencing, such as those based on occupation, class, and power status. "Compared with expansive literature on race and sex effects", writes Zatz (2000) in her review, "there are few studies of economic status and sentencing". This could be potentially compensated by research from other countries where ethnicity plays a much lesser role in the constitution of SES and class differences. In ethnically homogeneous South Korea, gender and age were found to be the only extra-legal factors contributing to sentencing disparities for drug-related crimes (Lee, Ulmer, and Park 2011) . A group of researchers (Liu, Zhou, Liska, Messner, Krohn, Zhang, and Lu 1998) conducted empirical research in China and found that the harshness of punishment is positively correlated with the individual's social status and negatively -with social status of friends, i.e. one's social networks. A study of sentencing in Rio de Janeiro, Brasil (Cano, Ribeiro, Francis, and Humphreys 2012) found no evidence of ethnic, gender or education-based status bias. Still, apart from these and a few other cases, as Ulmer (2012) noted in his review, sentencing research from countries other than USA remains scarce.
A problematic dimension of sentencing research is the relationship between empirical sentencing models derived from data analysis and legal models derived from formal sentencing rules. The role of sentencing rules and their application by judges often remains obscure. Analytically, the difference between disparity on the one hand, and bias or discrimination, on the other hand, is defined with reference to the absence (disparity) or presence (bias and discrimination) of the intentional use of legally irrelevant criteria in the sentencing process (Spohn 2009: 129) . But the case of evenhanded application of legal rules and procedures that nonetheless leads to differentiated outcomes are referred to by Spohn as "institutionalized discrimination" rather than "disparity", although no proof of intentional bias can be obtained in such a case. Empirical distinction between disparity and bias (discrimination) is difficult to draw, because the mechanisms of their production are subtle, diverse, and enveloped in legal reasoning. It is not always clear whether different sentencing outcomes emerge from judges' following the law, selectively applying or deliberately ignoring it.
The focal concerns perspective partly addresses the issue of institutionalized discrimination by describing how judges recur to social stereotypes when they apply certain policies that require an assessment of risk of recidivism and the probability of correction outside of the prison (Steffensmeier et al 1998) . One of their major concerns is the protection of the community, and the law normally requires taking into account prior criminal history, behavior and social conditions of the offender in order to assess the risk of repeated crime and correction potential. Within the protection of the community framework, for example, judges connect certain social characteristics of the offender, such as male gender and unemployment with the need for harsher punishment.
When sentencing disparities are produced by means of downward departures from sentencing guidelines, they have to be legally justified. Substantive assistance to investigation by the defendant is one such justification, but it has to be confirmed by the prosecutor. It is up to the prosecutor to qualify the behavior of defendant as substantive assistance and to file a motion. A recent study revealed disparities at the prosecution stage and showed the effects of social characteristics of the offender in substantive assistance motions that resulted in downward departures from sentencing guidelines (Spohn and Fornango 2009) .
In this study I use the simple procedure in order to distinguish disparity and bias. It can be referred to as the "no-bias presumption". It is assumed that all judges are neutral (i.e. nondiscriminating) and that all possible disparities stem from legal sentencing rules and their application or from other legally-relevant considerations. Then, any disparities revealed by the analysis that cannot be convincingly explained with reference to legal sentencing rules should be regarded as instances of judicial bias.
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This paper explores and explains sentencing disparities related to the social and occupational status of defendants tried in Russia's district courts for felony crimes. As most of research in this field, this study depends upon the availability and quality of data. It uses the opportunities provided by the new dataset consisting of 5 million individual decisions representing the entire criminal justice of Russia between 2009 and 2013. The paper makes several contributions to sociologically-oriented sentencing research.
First, it broadens the comparative perspective by adding a new jurisdiction to the few ones studied so far. Prison population in Russia in 2013 was 475 per 100 000, which is among the highest in the world (Walmsley 2013) . The heavy emphasis on criminal repression predicates the necessity of comprehensive research of its functioning. Russia's court statistics that uses uniform templates to enter information about each court case at all levels of the court system gives an opportunity to study the whole population of defendants and thus to establish regularities pertaining to the entire system of criminal justice.
Second, the new data allows testing the standard hypotheses of sentencing research concerning effects of social characteristics of defendants, such as gender, age, unemployment, citizenship, local residence, and marital status on the type and severity of punishment, controlling for legally relevant variables. Besides that, the new data allows assessing effects of finer social distinctions related to occupational status of defendants. The traditional sentencing research in the USA (except for studies of white-collar criminals back in the 1980s) is largely preoccupied with social characteristics in some ways associated with marginality, such as unemployment, (non)citizenship, race (black), or ethnicity (Hispanic). This study includes status effects among socially well-integrated groups defined through their position on the labor market (occupation).
Third, this paper seeks to understand how sentencing disparities are produced at the actor (interaction) level by relating the empirical model of sentencing to the formal-legal one and uses interviews with judges in order to reconstruct their reasoning and application of sentencing rules in the ways that produce sentencing disparities. I find that some social status disparities follow from the letter of law or from purely technical problems of the criminal procedure, some emerge from particular interpretations of its clauses in the practice of their application by judges, and some represent a clear collective bias. So the reproduction of the social structure of sentencing, as the Russian case shows, rests on a combination of different rationalities: legal, technical, and social.
The Russian court system has no reputation of meeting the highest standards of the rule of law, to say the least, and some view it as corrupt. This may raise concerns about the comparability of research results with other, especially Western jurisdictions. As a matter of fact, over 60 per cent of defendants in Russia are unemployed, over 20 per cent are manual workers, and another 7 per cent are ordinary office employees or students, so the absolute majority are low status low income persons who cannot afford any bribes or mobilize connections to ensure preferential treatment. Over 60 per cent of defendants use plea bargain procedure and over 90 per cent plead guilty. Cases of corruption, undue influence upon judges or politically orchestrated trials do happen in Russia, and they get a lot of media attention. But the routine work of criminal justice whereby every year about one million people get their verdicts is hardly affected by any of the above exceptional issues. In the routine mode it is internal mechanisms that govern the work of
Legal sentencing rules
The Russian legal system belongs to the continental European tradition of civil law. It relies on codified statute laws and procedural codes that regulate the application of laws. Despite the new Criminal Code (adopted in 1996) and the new Criminal Procedure Code (adopted in 2002), the procedure preserves a strong continuity with the Soviet criminal justice. The key features of the latter are the highly formalized investigation procedure and the domination of the investigatorprosecutor tandem, which results in a highly accusative bias with diminishing acquittal rate (Solomon 1987) . The criminal procedure system in Russia is often called neo-inquisitorial or investigatory, referring to the fact that the state in the face of its public officials objectively and on behalf of everyone concerned carries out the investigation of a crime to determine what happened (Burnham and Kahn 2008) .
The Criminal Code divides all criminal offences into four categories of seriousness (or gravity): low, medium, high, and particularly high. This classification determines the type of criminal procedure and sentencing rules. Low seriousness crimes (akin to misdemeanors) are the jurisdiction of the courts of peace (about 38 per cent of all cases). Medium, high and top seriousness crimes (felonies) are brought to courts of general jurisdiction (of district or regional level) through formalized investigation procedure maintained by several organizationally distinct actors: police operatives, investigators, and prosecutors. Once the investigation is completed, the case file is submitted to the prosecutor's office for review. In contrast to the adversarial AngloAmerican tradition where prosecution and defense present their evidence in trial before the judge, in the Russian system the judge is presented first of all with a written file that accumulates the previous work of the investigation and the prosecution. The defense side can collect its own evidence and proof in order to present it at the trial, leaving it to the discretion of the judge to formally include it into the case file and thus be taken into account.
The Code gives the judge limited discretion in determining the type of punishment and the sanction. Each degree of seriousness of offence is defined with reference to the maximum possible length of imprisonment measured in years. For low seriousness this is 3 years; 5 for medium, 10 for high and over 10 years -for especially high seriousness. The qualification of the offence, including the degree of seriousness, is the duty of the investigation, and the judge either confirms or reduces it. Besides four degrees of seriousness, each article of the Criminal Code describes each particular offence. Most articles have parts (subsections) that refer to different levels of seriousness of the offence depending upon the manner and circumstances. Each subsection prescribes an upper and (not always) a lower bound of sanction. For example, according to Part 1 of the Article 161 "Robbery", this crime is "punishable by community service for a term of up to four hundred and eighty hours, or by correctional works for a term of up to two years, or by restriction of freedom for a term of two to four years, or by an arrest for a term of up to six months, or by deprivation of freedom for a term of up to four years." Part 3 of the same Article 161 designates robbery committed by an organized group and sets the sanction from six to twelve years of imprisonment ("deprivation of freedom") with or without a fine of up to one million rubles.
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A notable feature of general sentencing rules is that they require the judge to look at social characteristics of the offender but do not specify which characteristics are important and how exactly they should affect the type and severity of punishment. Thus, Article 60 reads that "when making a sentencing decision the judge shall consider the nature and degree of social danger of crime, the personality of the convicted, including any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and also the influence of the imposed sanction on the rehabilitation of the convicted and on the conditions of life of his family." The law does not instruct how the personality of the defendant should be considered and which particular personality traits should affect the sentencing decision. Likewise, the law does not clarify how to assess the "rehabilitation potential" and "family conditions" in connection with the punishment.
Mitigating circumstances are well specified, but, as legal scholars note, their list is essentially open-ended (Smirnov and Kalinovskiy 2012). In each decision the judge has to explain in writing which circumstances are taken into account as either mitigating or aggravating. Both mitigating and aggravating circumstances include a range of standard characteristics of the offence and the offender.
1 Two aggravating circumstances have to be mentioned separately, because they refer to the occupational status. One is a premeditated crime committed by a law enforcement employee, and the other is when the crime involves the abuse of trust that the defendant enjoyed due to his or her administrative position.
On the one hand, the legal sentencing rules are quite specific: they describe each offense, including degrees of seriousness and corresponding intervals from which the punishment should be selected, as well as mitigating and aggravating circumstances that affect the type and severity of punishment. On the other hand, The Code requires the judge to consider social characteristics of the offender in order to assign a just and individualized punishment, but leaves it to practice to determine which characteristics merit attention and how they should be connected with sentencing decisions. This enables judges to make social characteristics of the offender legally relevant, but they have to justify this in writing or provide documental evidence. Interview sources indicate that in practice, judges look at the employment and family status, and the evidence of good conduct (reference letters) from one's place of work or residential community. But this does not imply that other status factors have no effects.
So, in the context of sentencing rules judges can react to the social status of the offender in several ways.
First, in respective cases they can follow the letter of law and regard the status of law enforcement employee as an aggravating circumstance, which leads to a harsher punishment.
Second, they can explicitly take into account certain offender characteristics and justify a softer or harsher punishment according to their vision of the social danger or rehabilitation potential of defendants following from these characteristics. This also includes cases of abuse of trust following from defendant's administrative position.
6 Third, judges can account for certain status characteristics of the offender in an implicit way, that is, without reference to sentencing rules or procedures, but one can still explain resulting disparities in outcomes by legal rather than extralegal reasons.
The above assumptions derived from the criminal law and its possible applications will serve as sources of hypotheses concerning social status effects and the origins of possible sentencing disparities. Apart from that one can assume that judges can account for social characteristics of offenders without any legal justification. Such cases, if discovered empirically, are likely to represent judicial bias.
Data
The main empirical source of this research is a confidential but not exclusive dataset consisting of 5,041,773 individual observations representing defendants who faced trial for criminal charges in courts of general jurisdiction (Federal Courts) and courts of peace of the Russian Federation between 2009 and 2013. Originally the information on defendants and their cases was recorded in the form of statistical cards routinely filled by judges or their assistants in a special electronic format for each criminal case they processed and submitted them to the regional branch of the Judicial Department, the agency in charge of court management. Since 2011 the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court in Moscow assembled statistical cards from all regional courts at the central server. In 2012 and 2014, the Institute for the Rule of Law of the European University at Saint-Petersburg requested and was given access to these cards for research purposes. The institute then converted them into the dataset.
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Each statistical card contains depersonified information about the defendant, offence(s), and charges; the identification of the court and the name of the judge as well as information about the trial procedure and its outcome. The statistical cards provide sufficient information for a comprehensive analysis of sentencing. With the exception of missing information and mistakes that were removed from the dataset, the latter contains information about the entire population of defendants and trial outcomes for the mentioned period 3 .
I censored the dataset in order to ensure the homogeneity of trial process subjected to the analysis. To avoid effects and restrictions of juvenile justice, all defendants under 18 years old (the age of full legal responsibility) were removed from the dataset. Defendants who at the moment of trial were in prison were also removed from the dataset because the range of possible decisions concerning inmates is constrained (in / out decision is not applicable, for example). I 7 narrowed the analysis to courts of the same type and level, leaving in only district courts (56 per cent of all cases). This also better serves the analytical focus of the paper on in / out decisions and the length of imprisonment (42 per cent of defendants receive real prison sentences in these courts). District courts handle cases corresponding to felonies and are homogeneous in terms of process and decision-making. 4 All of the above reduced the main dataset to 2,905,608
observations.
The main dataset does not have information about pretrial detention, because the Judicial Department statistical cards do not have the respective field. This is a sensitive omission, since previous studies established that pretrial detention affects the subsequent sentencing decision of the judge, increasing the probability of imprisonment (Spohn 2008; Sacks and Ackerman 2014) . A similar regularity obtains in Russia, as the recent study has revealed, and the social characteristics of the offender, such as employment, citizenship, and residence are significant predictors of detention (Titaev 2014).
To compensate for this deficiency of the main dataset we created an additional subset of sentencing decisions whereby the information on pretrial detention was extracted from texts of verdicts available online. The online public domain stores 1,424,898 verdict texts of criminal case trials. The quality of textual verdict data allowed only a limited one-to-one merger of text verdict information with the main dataset of court cases. 5 The resultant dataset with additional pretrial detention variable included 272,970 observations.
For interpreting the results of data analysis, this article also makes use of 27 interviews with judges collected in 2010-2013. Interviews focus on a broad range of issues, such as careers of judges, organizational aspects of their work, relations with court chairmen and superior courts, but also contain information on decision-making relevant for this study.
Social status variables
The standard statistical cards of the Judicial Department contain information concerning general social status characteristics of the offender: age, gender, education level, citizenship (Russian or other), local residence (permit), and marital status.
There are also fields in original cards that identify the occupation of defendant and his or her position (in the organization). These two fields allow constructing variables of occupational status that also partly correlate with the socioeconomic status of defendants.
I constructed the "unemployed" status by merging the following three categories from the official classifier: "registered as unemployed", "fit for work but no occupation", and "disabled (not fit for work)". All of these groups -each for its own reason -feature labor market marginality. They are perceived by judges, as interviews indicate, as socially marginal. The classifier also contains a broad category of students -individuals receiving secondary or higher education. The corresponding variable includes only students of 18 years and older and is referred to as "college students". Categories represented by very small numbers of defendants 4 Jury trials, for example, operate at regional-level courts only. 5 Courts are obliged to publicize verdict texts but there is not unified standard regarding the form and detail. As a result, different courts include different kind of case information. The merger strategy included matching available combinations of criminal case number, verdict date, judge name, first two primary charges, court type, and region name in verdict texts and the main dataset of court decisions.
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(for example, 12 judges and 9 notaries) as well as the larger category "other occupations" were assembled into the residual variable "other".
The administrative position field in the official classifier allows identifying whether the defendant is a "chief executive (owner) of an enterprise or an organization" or holds a "position of authority". I used this information for separating top managers (chief executives or holders of authority position) from ordinary office employees of commercial organizations. The logic of constructing occupational status variables from the official Judicial Department classifier is presented in Table 1 . The resulting set of occupational status variables is a compromise between the classification operated by judges and sociologically relevant categories.
Research hypotheses
The research objective of this paper is to establish whether there are sentencing disparities in Russian criminal courts of district level connected with social characteristics of the offender and if there are, to explain how they are produced at the interaction level. The main assumption is that the social status characteristics of the offender affect the type and severity of punishment (after the main legally relevant variables are taken into consideration) in the way that can be meaningfully related to the legal sentencing rules and procedures (the "no-bias presumption"). Then any statistically established disparities that cannot be meaningfully explained in terms of legal sentencing rules should be counted as instances of judicial bias.
The legal sentencing rules prescribed by the Russian Criminal Code (see the discussion above) allow formulating several hypothesis:
1. Law enforcers are punished more harshly. 2. Defendants whose social status denotes lower degree of integration in the Russian society, such as the unemployed, non-citizen, non-residents are punished more harshly. 3. Defendants with higher occupational status are punished more harshly, especially for white-collar crimes. 4. Married defendants receive a more lenient punishment Besides the initial hypotheses derived from legal sentencing rules, there can be other social status effects that cannot be hypothesized prior to the analysis.
Methodology and research design
The analysis includes the in / out decision (binary variable) and the assignment of the length of real imprisonment (logarithm) by district courts in felony cases as the main dependent variables. 6 The social status variables include age, gender, citizenship, local residence, marital status, employment status. Besides that the modelling includes occupation status variables (as in Table  1 ).
The analysis runs separate models for violent crimes 7 , theft, drug-related crimes, and fraud (the most widespread white-collar crime). Together these four categories of offences constitute 57 per cent of all cases in district courts.
To control for legally significant circumstances and regional variations the following strategy is applied. To control for crime seriousness for each type of offence I include fixed effects for article parts (subsections) of the Criminal Code that specify degrees of seriousness. I also include extensive control of the criminal history by including dummy variables of expired prior convictions, active convictions, and recidivism. 8 Because the law also requires taking into account the stage of committing a crime, three dummy variables are included (0 -completed offence; 1 -preparation, 2 -attempt). The plea bargain binary variable relates to what in Russia is known as "the special mode of trial", an equivalent to plea bargain that, according to the law, rewards the defendant with a softer punishment (except for top seriousness crimes). 9 To account for unobserved regional variations fixed effects for Russia's 83 regions are included in regression models. To account for possible effects of changes in the law half-year fixed effects are included.
I run multiple logistic regressions for in / out decisions, calculating marginal effects at mean levels of explanatory variables, and multiple OLS regressions for logarithm of sentence length. Coefficients in both regressions are interpreted as percent and are reported next to each other for each type of offence. By comparing probabilities of imprisonment for each social status category with disparities in sentence length I seek to identify consistent patterns of sentencing disparities.
6 Due to the ultralow acquittal rate that in district courts is 0,4 per cent, the analysis of acquittal decisions is technically problematic. 7 Violent crimes include light, medium, and severe body injury but excludes murder and homicide. 8 The Russian law and criminal statistics has three types of prior record: expired past convictions; active conviction that does not constitute recidivism; and active conviction that constitutes recidivism. Only the latter constitutes an aggravated circumstance, but in practice, all past convictions lead to harsher punishment. 9 For the specific features of plea bargain in Russia see Solomon (2012) .
The most consistent will be those that indicate both higher probability of imprisonment and longer sentence or the reverse (lower and shorter) for all offence types.
The research design includes two parts. In the first part I look at the general social status predictors, include all occupational groups in an undifferentiated way comparing them only with the unemployed. In this part I also model recidivism and assess which social status characteristics of offender increase the probability of recidivism in order to see whether sentencing disparities can be attributed to judges' adequate prediction of social danger operationalized as inclination towards repeated offending. In the first part I also use the additional data subset that includes pretrial detention variable in order to test its effects and the robustness of other general social status variables when pretrial detention variable is included.
In the second part I reduce the initial dataset by excluding all socially marginal defendants (the unemployed) and those labelled "other", leaving in defendants who have positive and defined occupational status, referring to them as socially well-integrated groups. This analysis aims at the separate assessment of occupational status effects. "Manual workers" is used as the reference category. In these models I also include general social status predictors but do not report them.
All models include control variables specified above. 10 The summary statistics is presented in Table 2 . 
Findings
First we look at the effects of general social status, then make additional tests using the smaller dataset with pretrial detention variable, and then look at the effects of occupational status among well-integrated social groups.
General social status characteristics
In the first set of models in Table 3 we observe consistent effects of unemployment statusbeing unemployed increases chances of imprisonment and its length for all three types of crimes. Thus, being unemployed predicts 10 per cent higher probability of imprisonment for theft and 3 per cent longer sentence.
Gender disparities are quite pronounced as well, male gender predicting higher probability of imprisonment for violent offences and theft, but not for drug-related offences where gender disparity is almost non-existent.
The citizenship effect is consistent and strong for in/out decisions, predicting 15 to 20 per cent lower chances of receiving a prison sentence for Russian citizens.
The effect of being a local resident has a similar pattern. It considerably reduces the probability of imprisonment compared to non-locals. However, when the imprisonment decision concerning local residents is chosen, this status predicts a longer sentence length. This difference is more radical for property theft (up to 19 per cent), but does not obtain in drug crimes. We can observe a similar pattern with regard to the married status for theft and drugs. 
Recidivism
When making in/out decision a major concern for judges is the social danger of defendant, i.e. the assessed probability of recidivism. Judges cannot assess this on the individual basis when there is no previous criminal record. Instead, judges can rely on social categories that for them have some predictive capacity based on previous experience of dealing with recidivism. To test whether their predictions revealed in Table 3 are consistent with objective regularities of recidivist behavior I run a separate set of regressions and include the main social status predictors. Results are reported in Table 4 .
We see that unemployment and male status are strong predictors of recidivism (less so for drug offences), while higher education (very strongly!), local residence, and marital status reduce the probability of recidivism. This is quite consistent with judges' expectations and their perception of social status characteristics as indicators of higher or lower inclination to commit repeated offense -as expressed in their imprisonment policy (in/out decisions). This regularity does not obtain for higher education status that has minor effects on imprisonment decisions despite strong negative connection with recidivism.
Citizenship plays a very different role. Russian citizenship strongly predicts recidivism but reduces rather than increases the probability of imprisonment. This seeming contradiction is perfectly explainable by the assumption that foreign citizens leave or are deported after the first conviction and rarely come back (or are not allowed in) and thus have lower chances to commit another crime in Russia. Thus, they are likely to be imprisoned for reasons other than the fear of recidivism. To test whether social status-related sentencing disparities with regard to in/out decision are produced at the trial stage rather than at the pretrial stage when decision about detention is made, the pretrial detention variable has to be included. This analysis serves as a test of robustness of social status effects in the previous model that lacks this variable (Table 3) as well as the source 13 of additional information for explaining how judges account for the social status of defendant in in / out decisions.
When the pretrial detention variable is included in the model (Table 5) , it shows the strongest effect on imprisonment decision. The strength of citizenship and local residence is somewhat lower than they are in the model in Table 3 relative to other predictors, but these and other social status variables preserve their significance and direction. The modelling of pretrial detention decisions earlier by Kirill Titaev (2014) using a different dataset as well as by the author of this paper (not included here) show significant effects of unemployment that increases and Russian citizenship and local residence that reduces the probability of detention.
Occupational status
The separate modelling of occupational status effects with regard to socially well-integrated defendants (after all unemployed and indefinite status defendants were censored) also includes fraud as a major white collar crime (see. Table 6 ). The analysis shows several consistent patterns.
As expected, law enforcers receive harsher treatment in courts. Their sentencing pattern is partially consistent -they have considerably higher probability of imprisonment, but no significant disparities regarding length. The only exception is a shorter prison term for fraud.
Entrepreneurs are punished more harshly for all types of crime. They are more likely to be imprisoned and also receive longer sentences. Sentencing disparities related to top managers -the groups close to entrepreneurs in their social status and nature of work -are similar to those of entrepreneurs'.
Students are treated more leniently in a consistent way -less probability of imprisonment and lower sentence length for all types of crime compared to all other occupational group.
Other differences are minor and irregular. The sentencing of public officials and office employees show little difference from that of manual workers used as the reference category. 
Discussion
The analysis of sentencing -in / out decisions and length of imprisonment -established the following regularities with regard to the social characteristics of defendants. All other things being equal 1. The unemployed are treated consistently harsher both with regard to the type and duration of punishment for all offence types. 2. Males are more probable to be imprisoned than women save for drug related offences where differences disappear. 3. Russian citizen, local residents, and married defendants are less probable to be imprisoned than non-Russians, non-locals, and single; but local residents and married receive longer sentences. 4. Law enforcement employees have higher probability of imprisonment for all major offence types but they receive shorter sentences for fraud. 5. Entrepreneurs and top managers are treated consistently harsher both with regard to the type and duration of punishment for all offence types. 6. College students are treated consistently more leniently both with regard to the type and duration of punishment for all offence types.
So the initial hypotheses concerning the law enforcement employees, the unemployed, citizen, local residents, and married were confirmed by the analysis. The hypothesis about harsher punishment of higher status groups for white collar crimes was partly confirmed. The analysis also revealed disparities that could not be hypothesized from the legal sentencing rules: harsher treatment of men; more lenient sentencing with regard to college students; harsher treatment of entrepreneurs for conventional crimes; higher sentence length for citizen, locals, and married, lower sentence length for law enforcement employees for fraud.
Since the main objective of this paper is not only to reveal disparities, but to understand their origin, to explain them, I have to look at nuances and refer the empirical sentencing models back to legal sentencing rules and their application by judges. Sentencing disparities, I assume, originate from practical rationalities of judges some of which are grounded in the application of formal legal rules, some in legitimate concerns of judges, some in technical conditions of the criminal process, and some in extralegal concerns and attitudes.
Gender bias, well known in the international sentencing research (Spohn 2009) , is also present in the Russian criminal justice. Men are regarded more socially dangerous and are subjected to more frequent imprisonment decisions. This logic is indirectly supported by the fact that this bias is the strongest with regard to violent crimes for which physical gender differences matter and virtually non-existent in drug offences where such differences less relevant. A more thorough study of this aspect of sentencing in Russia is available (Chetverikova 2015).
General social status characteristics, such as unemployment, citizenship, local residence, and marital status produce disparate outcomes within the framework of sentencing rules. While there seems to be a general logic predicting more lenient treatment of defendants who are better integrated into society through employment, citizenship, local community, and family as opposed to socially marginal elements deprived of these ties, such an explanation is insufficient. First, there are different ways in which judges account for social integration and marginality. Second, some of the mentioned status effects have composite origin.
The law requires judges to take into account the degree of social danger from crime and the personality of defendant. In interviews judges explain how they do it in practice. When making in / out decisions, they assess the chances of repeated criminal behavior and the possibility of correction outside of the prison. If the defendant has no job or occupation then he has no permanent income, and this, as judges reason, will sooner or later push him towards another offence. Likewise, judges expect employed, local residents or married defendants to have lower predisposition to recidivism and higher chances of correction outside prison due to social control associated with primary communities. The regression analysis of recidivism (Table 4) shows that their expectations are not ungrounded.
As a judge indicated in the interview, "If this is the first time he committed a crime, if he has a job, if I see he is characterized positively, […] I will consider the crime a random event and will not sent him to prison."
Social marginality also affects the verdict through the procedure of reviewing written characteristics and reference letters from defendant's work or the place of residence. The practice requires judges to include reference letters in the case file and mention them in the verdict ("characterized positively") in order to justify a softer sentence or the choice of a non-carceral punishment. Thus defendant's membership in diverse social or occupational groups gives opportunities to provide multiple evidence of good character and thereby to soften the punishment. Defendants who are unemployed lack this opportunity, which for the judge also signifies that the community will not provide sufficient control over the individual in case imprisonment is suspended.
The interpretative theory of legal decision-making (Farrell and Holmes 1991) and the theory of focal concerns (Steffensmeier et al 1998) emphasize the role of status-related stereotypes and labelling in assigning punishment. 11 This paper shows that judges tend to rely on social status to predict the degree of social danger and correction potential, but this process does not operate as a simple perceptual shorthand to save effort, but involves legal framing and special procedures. In the Russian criminal justice unemployment, local residence, and marital status can be viewed as legally relevant factors.
There is also a more technical origin of social status effects, especially of citizenship. It has to do with pretrial detention, the physical availability of defendant during pretrial investigation and the possibility to carry out a non-carceral punishment in practice. The model of pretrial detention confirms that foreigners, non-locals, defendants who have no social attachments in the area where the crime was committed and the trial is to take place, are more likely to be detainedmost likely, for the fear of escape. At the post-trial stage, judges are reluctant to assign fines or suspended imprisonment to foreign citizens for the same reasons. The modelling (Table 5) shows that pretrial detention is also a strong separate predictor of imprisonment decision at the trial stage, so the general social status characteristics affect the sentence also through the previous decision to detain. In the case of foreigners, the fear of recidivism is not the issue.
The clear case of legally grounded status disparity is that of law enforcement employees with regard to whom judges have been shown to follow legal sentencing rules by considering this status an aggravating circumstance. Judges interpret it as an additional reason for real imprisonment rather than for a longer sentence. At the same time, they make a discount to law enforcement employees when sentencing for fraud, although the law would require them to do the opposite when the offense involved the abuse of trust related to the power of office.
The sentencing patterns for white-collar crimes merit attention, because they point to an intraelite conflict. The analysis shows consistently harsher punishments of entrepreneurs and top managers for all types of crime, not just fraud. But fraud allows to highlight the case of negative bias. Russian law lists the abuse of trust by a person holding an official position an aggravating factor. A similar explanation, we know, was made by Wheeler, Weisburd, and Bode (1982) who found a strong positive relationship between socioeconomic status and the severity of punishment for white-collar crimes. Authors explained it by judges' high concern with crimes committed by persons in positions of trust and authority. Entrepreneurs and, to a lesser extent, top managers in Russia are punished more severely for fraud, but for the Wheeler et al. proposition to hold, other occupants of the position of trust and authority, namely, law enforcers and public officials, should have been treated in the same way. In fact they are treated more leniently. This finding provides an empirical confirmation of propositions about complicated state-business relations in Russia (Frye 2004; Yakovlev 2006) .
If judges have humanistic attitudes, the main beneficiaries are college students. This bias is the most unexpected finding in this research. A significant but unknown proportion of students are formally unemployed but they are punished more leniently not only in comparison to the unemployed, but to all occupation groups. Judges view them as striving to make a career in society and do not see them as inherently dangerous or criminal deserving to be isolated from society. Since no separate legal justification of the attitude that distinguishes students from other socially well-integrated groups is identifiable, we can regard it an extralegal judicial bias.
What remains unexplained and needs further discussion is the combination of lower chances to end up in prison and longer prison sentence in the case of Russian citizen, local residents, and married defendants for certain types of offences.
Conclusion
This paper made the first analysis of sentencing disparities related to social characteristics of offenders in Russia. It also used the largest dataset of sentencing decisions available to researchers so far. The data allowed to account for general social status characteristics as well as for finer occupational differences.
The general idea of this analysis was to use the "no-bias presumption" in relation to judges, that is, to assume that judges are neutral and that all possible disparities stem from legal sentencing rules and their interpretation or from other legally-relevant considerations. Then if, despite all the effort, the analysis would reveal disparities that cannot be explained in terms of legal sentencing rules, they can be counted as instances of judicial bias (discrimination).
Objectively speaking, the Russian criminal justice system is socially biased to a rather strong degree. Not only that marginal and lower class individuals constitute up to 80 per cent of defendants, they, especially the unemployed, are also punished more severely -removed from society and for longer periods than other categories. The old dusty ideas of neo-Marxists (Rusche and Kirchheimer 1939) and critical criminologists (Chambliss and Seidman 1971) who argued that low class and marginal groups are the major targets of systems of punishment can still be a useful background for understanding the systemic dimension of sentencing disparities. But if socially differentiated punishment patterns are to be taken as symptoms of social conflict, in Russia the conflict also has more subtle dimensions, penetrating to upper levels of society and involving economic elites and state bureaucracy.
On the interaction level, i.e. on the level of judicial decision making in the legal context, we can see that a great deal of sentencing disparities, although they point in the direction of relative degree of social integration, are perfectly explainable in terms of legal rules and their application. Most social characteristics of offenders have become legally relevant in the context of the current sentencing practice. The pressure upon marginal elements and foreigners, the majority of whom are migrant workers from the former Soviet Union republics turned independent states, is built into the legal system itself. What can be cautiously associated with
